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Democracy in the Andes: from high expectations to attrition 
For a fleeting time, enormous hopes in the future of democracy could be found in the Andean 
area.1  Between the end of the seventies and the early eighties, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia put 
their military regimes behind them.  Colombia relaxed the restrictions of its consociational 
regime and laid the groundwork for more open competition.  Venezuela, the area’s most 
developed and stable country, had also had a consociational regime and it was now also 
sliding toward a more competitive regime.  The area seemed to be heading toward a safe port, 
according to the five basic aspects of democratic consolidation: avoid collapse, avoid erosion, 
institutionalise democracy, complete it and deepen it.2 
This impression of slow, perhaps, but firm transition and/or consolidation now seems totally 
out of place.  After a period of instability and war, Peru saw the collapse of its democracy and 
the advent of the Fujimori regime, which lasted ten long years and was supported, at least in 
its first phase, by solid electoral majorities.  Since democracy was restored, the new President, 
Alejandro Toledo, has had no respite and is now, in mid-2002, one of South America’s most 
discredited rulers.  Venezuela, too, experienced a rupture of its political institutionality, which 
has both major similarities and evident differences with the Peruvian process.  Ecuador has 
suffered endemic instability, punctuated by economic and institutional crises.  Colombia is 
submerged in a bloodbath and, while various democratic institutions and practices remain, 
citizens’ basic rights are severely deteriorated, a situation that will predictably worsen in the 
near future.  Only Bolivia seems to have escaped this dynamic of democratic dismantling and 
involution, but even there, some of society’s basic conflicts have begun to overflow 
institutional channels, and Bolivians’ degree of satisfaction with democracy is as alarmingly 
low as in the other Andean countries (see Table 1).  Worst of all is that no perspective of 
recovery and consolidation appears to be in sight in any of the five countries. 
The democratic involution of the Andean countries is not, however, easy to grasp.  None of 
them, not even Peru, has fallen into openly dictatorial regimes.  What we have witnessed is 
the gradual installation of a ‘strong presidentialism’ characterised by the weakening of 
                                                 
* This is a revised version of the Spanish-language original, published by the Crisis States Research Centre as 
Documento de Trabajo 25, ‘Los tiempos de las involuciones democráticas’ (March 2003). We are grateful to 
Judy Butler for her translation into English upon which this revision has been based. It reports findings from the 
project ‘Democratic Sustainability in the Andes’, funded by the Crisis States Research Centre, and coordinated at 
the Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales by Francisco Gutiérrez, with the participation of 
María Emma Wills (see ‘Peru’s Failed Search for Political Stability (1968-2000), Crisis States Working Paper 
30, London: Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, 2003), María Teresa Pinto, and Juan Carlos Rodríguez. This 
project has tried to grasp the contrast between the common issue and the multiplicity of national variations; and, 
following Whitehead’s lead, has sought to understand what this could possibly say to the literature on 
democratic transitions (Lawrence Whitehead, ‘Bolivia and the Viability of Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 
12:2 (2001), p.8). 
1 Whitehead (2001). The Andean region will be understood herein as the following five countries: Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. 
2 Andreas Schedler, ‘Concepts of democratic consolidation’, presented at LASA, Guadalajara, 1997, p.4. 
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controls on the executive branch, 3 the emasculation of the congress and the formation of new 
majorities with anti-parliamentarian and anti-corruption motives.  This has happened amid 
radical changes in the party system led by elected ‘outsiders’ (who claim to oppose the 
established parties and practices) and their forces: Fujimori with his Cambio 2000 and Chávez 
with his Bolivarianism are only the most prominent examples of a phenomenon that has 
traversed the Andean world like a new phantom. 
Table 1.  Satisfaction with democracy in the Andean countries. 
Source: Latinobarómetro 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Colombia 16% 40% 24% 27% 
Venezuela 30% 35% 35% 55% 
Ecuador 34% 31% 33% 23% 
Peru  28% 21% 17% 24% 
Bolivia 25% 34% 34% 22% 
 
While this process unquestionably involves a deterioration of democracy, it cannot be 
explained away simply as a return to populism or to old dictatorial traditions, for at least three 
reasons.  First, the rebellion against traditional political intermediation is linked to new forms 
of conceiving of political modernity that have received the support of a significant part of the 
citizenry, as well as of international actors.  In fact, the anti-politicians think of themselves as 
pedagogues and cultural critics of pre-modernity.  Second, corruption has become a critical 
issue for almost all democracies in the world, not only the Andean ones, and the outsiders in 
the area have been adept at constructing a reservoir of civic symbols and arguments that name 
the problem and offer solutions.  In particular, they have successfully linked public morality, 
civic pedagogy and an anti-congress and/or anti-party discourse into a powerful alloy that has 
managed to change the map of political preferences and identities in a very short time.  Third, 
the dismantling of the old institutions – supported by massive reforms and new constitutions – 
was offered to the population as a massive inclusion and thus as an expansion of democracy 
and citizenship.  Liberation from the ‘party-ocracy’ in Venezuela and Ecuador, Colombia’s 
participatory democracy and even the Fujimori phenomenon in Peru, which proceeded under 
the motto of ‘direct democracy’, were presented as forms of expanding, not destroying, civic 
participation and of liberation from the old forms and machinery that oppressed them.  In that 
regard, the declaration of former President León Febres Cordero is characteristic: 
Liberty is for all.  In Ecuador there can be no second-class Ecuadorians, thus 
we’ve asked Ecuadorians if they want independents to have the same right as 
those affiliated to political parties…  A yes vote [in the plebiscite] is a vote in 
defence of the infringed-upon rights of independents in Ecuador.  A no vote plays 
the game of the parties’ political cliques.…4 
The evolution of democracy in the five countries clearly does not obey a single set of 
regularities.  The differences among Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia are 
obvious at first glance.  The central problems of each political community are different, but 
this is precisely what makes the area’s attraction toward a strong presidentialist system with 
                                                 
3 Juan J. Linz & Arturo Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 
4 In César Montúfar, La reconstrucción neoliberal, Febres Cordero o la estatización del neoliberalismo en el 
Ecuador 1984-1988, Quito: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar – Abya Yala, 2000, p.84. 
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all its implications – the closing then re-adaptation of congress to make it more docile and 
efficient, the collapse of the traditional forms of intermediation and the centrality of anti-
political forces and discourses – so striking.  
This article focuses on discussing the diverse aspects of the involution in the Andean area, 
and on examining its relationship to mechanisms of democratic unsustainability – in other 
words, to forces that undermine the possibility of a democratic regime reproducing itself.  The 
basic context is simple.  The Andean countries, like many others, have in reality lived through 
a dual transition, on the one hand of their political regime and on the other of their 
development model.  In both cases, a relatively neat difference can be established between 
Period 1 (the sixties and seventies) and Period 2 (the eighties and nineties).5  Period 2, though, 
did  not fulfil its promise (openness, both economic and political).  Democracy and the new 
economic model have not gotten on very well in the Andes.  As will be seen throughout the 
text, I am not proposing either that the first development model – endogenous – was more 
inclined toward democracy or that there is a necessary contradiction between democracy and 
the new development model.  They can coexist well, poorly or somewhere in between 
according to the historic contingency.  This obliges the analyst to specify the mechanisms that 
have led to outcomes that deteriorate democracy in the Andes.  In this regard, I will suggest 
that: a) the tensions between the two transitions simultaneously undermine democracy and 
maintain it as a basic political regime; and b) the set of challenges and solutions that 
characterised the Andean countries’ democratic options in the first development period have 
not shown themselves to be very viable in the new circumstances, rendering some of 
democratic life’s central institutions – congress and parties – victims of an obsolescence 
process.  In particular, the transformations of politics and of all things political have made it 
difficult to create consociational pacts.  Explicit pactism may have constituted the Andean 
democratic alternative in the 1970’s, but save exceptional conditions, they are not viable in 
Period 2.   
The protagonist of the entire analysis will be time – or rather, the times.  I will try to show 
from different angles how the times of democratic transition have become a decisive factor of 
disagreement between development and democracy in the Andean countries, and how they 
have also influenced the pact alternatives and their viability.  I have divided the article into 
four parts.  The first one establishes briefly what the main changes in Period 2 are: a simple 
and relatively easy piece of ‘comparative statics’.   The second analyses the interplay between 
economic and politic factors (the very core of the ‘dual transition’), and discusses how this 
can provoke temporal mismatches that weaken democracy.  I argue that the need to push 
through reforms that are urgent, yet can only be evaluated over time, has been an extremely 
heavy burden on the democratic institutions, and undermines political liberalism in general.  
The third section focuses on the obsolescence of core democratic institutions. I discuss what 
has happened with the congress (the (temporal) dilemma of agreeing to pay ‘decision costs’ or 
‘externalities’) and the parties (the emergence of a new economy of signals formally posed in 
the terms of a rebellion of the future against the past).  Here I also show that the problems of 
Period 2 might trigger political cycles of chronic instability. Part four deals with populism.  
This is a very old problem, about which an overwhelming literature has been written.   
Finally, I face the obvious: is there not a time of dissolution and breakdown?  Were the 
regimes of Period 1 not condemned to death, due to their own inertias, closures and tensions? 
Are we not witnessing a natural process stemming from material fatigue?  The conclusions 
deal with the specifics of the Andean region. 
                                                 
5  For a longer and much more elaborated periodisation, see Paul Drake & Eric Hershberg, ‘Crisis in the Andes’, 
multigraph, August 2001. 
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Periodisation  
Three basic conditions have changed dramatically between Periods 1 and 2.  In the first place, 
the set of relations that the countries in the area had with the United States.  In Period 1, it was 
motivated by the defence agains t an extra-continental state, the Soviet Union.  That defence, 
in turn, combined ideological and military containment with social reforms, as contemplated 
in the Alliance for Progress.  In the second place, concern about the nature of the political 
regime – with the exception of whether they were inclined toward communism – did not 
come onto the agenda of the international context, or of the relations between the Andean 
countries and the United States.  In other words, there was latitude to move away from 
democracy; in Period 2, this was substantially reduced.  In the third place, the economy was 
more ‘closed’ (in a technical sense, i.e. self-contained).  Capital was much less mobile than 
today, 6 and the development model was centred on the domestic market.  The technical basis 
for this change has been analysed numerous times.7 
This explains the ecological diversity that can be observed in the Andean countries in the 
sixties and seventies (see Table 2).  There had been consociational pacts in both of the 
northern Andean countries, Venezuela and Colombia – Punto Fijo and Frente Nacional, 
respectively – that bound the parties within the political system to a previously convened 
alternation and subordinated the military to civilian rule.  In Ecuador, there was a non-
democratic alternation between turbulent populist governments and reformist military ones.  
Military officers who advocated social reforms and a certain level of grassroots mobilisation 
were also the protagonists of the period in Peru.  Almost without interruption, Bolivia lived 
under dictatorships of various ideological stripes, and was characterised by major instability. 
Table 2 
Regime/Period Period 1 Period 2 
Reformist military 
Ecuador-Peru-Bolivia (Juan José 
Torres)  
Dictatorships  Bolivia   
Consociational pacts  Venezuela, Colombia  Bolivia  
Strong presidentialism  Peru, Venezuela  
Democracy without pact  Ecuador, Colombia  
 
 
                                                 
6  The point should not be exaggerated, however.  Several Andean rulers were quick to manifest their concern 
about the possibility of capital flight if they made certain decisions.  But it was a different phenomenon, both by 
order of magnitude and by its very nature, with the empirical proof being that various governments adopted 
public policies in Period 1 that would be utterly unthinkable in Period 2. 
7  Which underscores, if needed, that the contrast between the two periods is not about nostalgia or the aphorism 
that ‘everything was better in the past’.  Period 1 disappeared never to return, among other reasons because the 
new technical base has brought about a completely different world that cannot be rolled back.  One of the best 
analyses of the nature of these changes and their global impact on democracy is found in Volker Bornschier, 
‘Changing income inequality in the second half of the 20th Century:  Preliminary findings and propositions for 
explanation’, Journal of World Systems Research, 8:1 (2002), pp.100-127. 
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Note that the margin of latitude of the rulers – or aspirants to the post – to establish their 
government’s three basic parameters did not necessarily favour the population.  The 
agnosticism of the international context with respect to the nature of the regime could shield 
brutal waves of repression and crimes against humanity.  The struggle against the external 
enemy could encourage all manner of outrages against the population in the name of fidelity 
to a common cause.  The closed economy, to use a well-known example, could punish 
consumers while favouring inefficient and/or corrupt industrialists. 
Period 2 involves the move from a closed order to an open one, and with it the shrinking of 
the manoeuvring room in the three parameters mentioned above.  Fleeing from democracy 
can have very high costs.  The economy is now open and in the case of relative sudden 
changes in economic policy, capitalists can vote with their feet (or, better said, with their 
fingers on a computer keyboard).  Citizens are the ones who can more accurately vote with 
their feet by emigrating, although with more restrictions than capital.  The government’s 
entangled links with different international agencies – from the International Monetary Fund 
to the risk qualifiers – is so dense that one could comfortably assume that the economic 
programme of these weak, subordinated countries with medium-low development is  relatively 
fixed in the following sense: those opposing the standard liberal reforms can try to block 
them, but cannot propose viable alternatives. 
This aside, there is a possible comparison with respect to the results, although with various 
difficulties.  Some of them will be touched on here in passing, but none calls into question the 
‘phenomenological’ aspect of the issue: in democratic transitions, the population evaluates the 
results based on available information (its own experience) and compares the  old regime with 
the new.  Here several of the Andean area’s specificities begin to stand out.  In the first pace, 
their military regimes – unlike the dictatorships of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, and those 
of southern Europe and many of the Eastern European socialist ones – were rather 
‘dictablandas’ (soft dictatorships) involved in long-brewing exercises to promote social 
reforms and grassroots mobilisation (constrained, of course).  They obviously used repression 
and were affected by inefficiency and corruption, but neither in Ecuador nor in Peru were the 
armed forces discredited as a demiurge of national breakdown.  Even in Venezuela, where the 
dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez had a more traditionally ‘Latin American’ complexion, 
legitimation via ‘progress’ was not completely unattainable.  Bolivia is the exception, 8 and 
this has had simple but important consequences, as I will try to show later on.  In the second 
place, contrary to other countries with a higher development level, extensive modernisation 
had not topped out when the political transition began.  Thus, upon evaluating the change, 
many relevant sectors felt they had lost out.  While Latin America’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) doubled between the sixties and eighties, with annual growth rates of between 5% and 
6%, growth was perilously close to 0% in the succeeding two decades.9  If the issue is 
observed from the perspective of the per-capita GDP, the Andean area had sustained growth 
in Period 1 and screeched to a halt in Period 2. 
This, however, is but a small part of the story.  The growth in Period 1 was perhaps 
unsustainable and its own dynamic was giving out, as the debt crisis in the eighties and the 
terrible performance of the area’s anti-adjustment governments (Paz Zamora in Bolivia and 
Alan García in Peru) underscores.  In addition, the international context changed radically, 
which demanded adaptive responses.  Furthermore, the braking in Period 2 may have 
                                                 
8 It has had several highly repressive dictatorships, and the last one, that of García Meza, was intimately related 
to drug trafficking, which generated serious problems with the United States. 
9  Income distribution, which was already bad, also worsened, brusquely in some countries. 
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corresponded to a temporary sacrifice – the notion involved in the term ‘adjustment’ – to put 
the accounts in order and guarantee sustained and sustainable growth.  The story would then 
be one of austerity today in order to have prosperity tomorrow.  There are many ways to 
object to this viewpoint, however.10  Independent of the turn that such a discussion takes, 
there are two fundamental consequences for the political transition.  First, important sectors of 
the population have good reasons to assume that they have lost with democracy (or at least 
have gained nothing with it).  In other words, there is a schism between the agendas of 
democratisation and development, in which the first ends up the loser.  Such a motive is 
obvious behind some of the area’s most important examples of collapse and deterioration in 
recent years, such as Venezuela’s conflicts and the turbulent events in Ecuador.  It also feeds 
the thematising of public ills linked to endowment effects (a ‘favour’ conferred over the years 
may become an obligation), as happened during the Chavist insurgency.  Second, serious 
problems appear regarding the construction of viable temporal horizons for democratic 
intermediation.  Insofar as the justification for governmental policies resides in a relatively 
distant future, some typical forms of liberal democracy – ranging from the idea that citizens 
are the best judges of their own interests,11 to mechanisms such as the punishment vote – are 
fatally weakened. 
In synthesis, choosing two periods permits both a comparison of the two and an analysis of 
the transition from one to the other.  It cannot be over-stressed that such a comparison is not 
normative – is yesterday better than today? – simply because yesterday’s options are no 
longer available and probably will not be in the future.  It does, however, have analytic 
interest: how have the multiple interrelations between the two transitions influenced 
democracy and politics? 
 
The times of economics and politics.   
There is a venerable and powerful intellectual tradition regarding the political economy of 
democratic outcomes, of which Barrington Moore is probably the most brilliant exponent.  
Basing himself on the European experience, Moore concluded that the ways in which the 
upper rural classes and the peasants reacted to the challenge of commercial agriculture were 
decisive factors that led to certain political results.12  Perry Anderson tested out an interesting 
adaptation for Latin America, proposing a diagonal interaction in which the interrelation 
between labourers and landowners would decide the political outcomes.  A strong labour 
movement and weak landowners, such as in Argentina and Chile, would lead to dictatorships, 
while weak landowners and weak workers, as in Venezuela, would lead to democracy. 13  Put 
another way, democracy would depend on the lack of intensity of social conflict, or of the 
actors involved in them, a somewhat inexact idea but one with a very powerful underlying 
basic intuition. 
                                                 
10  To complicate things even more, that is symmetrically inverse to that of the defenders of real socialism, who 
upheld their own system with the idea of sacrifices in order to obtain benefits tomorrow.  Neoliberals exhibit the 
same religious faith when they maintain that all the failures of the adjustment programs are their lack of match 
with the real world –the Platonic model, however, is still correct. 
11 This aspect has been stressed forcefully by Bernard Manin et al., ‘Introduction’, in Bernard Manin et al. (eds), 
Democracy, accountability, and representation , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
12 Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the 
Modern World, Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. 
13 Perry Anderson, Democracia y socialismo.  La lucha democrática desde una perspectiva socialista, Buenos 
Aires: Tierra del Fuego, 1988. 
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It is necessary to return periodically to these classic reflections, but in so doing, their 
weaknesses are revealed by their own strengths; both drink from the same fountain.  First of 
all, they lack micro-foundations and sidestep the crucial problems in the construction of 
collective action.  Because they are analyses supported only in the long haul, they cannot 
provide a good explanation for the variability of models that a single country exhibits: that is, 
its trajectory, which can move in and out of democracy (even intermittently).  The same 
Bolivia that galloped into capitalism on the back of a powerful workers’ movement and some 
weakened landowners has had periods of brutal dictatorial instability and of working 
democracy.  In a less evident manner, they assume that what attracts democratic trajectories is 
a point (a final result that does not move unless there is an exogenous shock), when in reality 
there can be more complicated forms: for example, a cyclical movement or the segment of a 
curve.  The Andean experience seems to suggest that this is precisely the case for many 
countries, whose outcome is not well defined with an arrival station but rather with a 
fluctuation among various political forms. 
If the goal is to find something that allows social structures to be related to political ones, 
perhaps the best strategy would be to look into people’s concrete experience using a 
phenomenological approach.  I will start by noting that Period 2 was one of economic crisis 
for all the countries – with a very important time lag in Colombia.  There are two kinds of 
crisis: of inflation and of growth, and both have two things in common.  They etch themselves 
into the memory of the populations – in other words, they have long inertial effects on 
political behaviour – and they can set democracy staggering, as Przeworski and associates 
have shown based on a big numbers comparison. 14  In the Andean area, it is easy to note that 
hyperinflation crises have generated ‘rightwing’ solutions: that is, ample consensus around an 
adjustment programme that anything can be forgiven as long as it solves the main problem.  
Such is the case of Peru and Bolivia.15  When the problem is one of growth, the social 
turbulence generates ‘leftwing’ solutions, as in Venezuela, or cycles of instability, as in 
Ecuador.  Crossing the economic variable with the degree of disparagement suffered by the 
preceding military regime, in other words with the legacy of the previous period, we find the 
following classification of outcomes (see Table 3).   
Table 3A – Andean countries 
 Discredited Military Regime  Not Discredited Military Regime  
Hyperinflation 
Democracy with pact around the 
adjustment Dictatorship with adjustment 
Growth Developmentalist democracy Developmentalist dictatorship 
 
Table 2B – Colombian version 
 Discredited military Not discredited military 
Security  Democracy with pact Rightwing civilians 
Growth Democracy with reforms Party government 
                                                 
14 Adam Przeworski, et al., Democracy and development.  Political institutions and well-being in the World, 
1950-1990, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 




When hyperinflation takes place in a society in which the military is seriously discredited 
because the immediately previous regime had produced enormous damage (as in Bolivia or 
Argentina), a relatively stable democratic pact is produced around the adjustment.  The 
memory of hyperinflation remains and hence the degree of opposition either to the 
government making the adjustment or to its economic policies is low – and stays that way for 
years.  When it appears in a society in which the military is not discredited, it produces a 
regime breakdown, as in Peru.  When the crisis is one of growth, there is rupture if the 
military has the initial backing of the elites, as in Venezuela.16  If, on the contrary, the initial 
situation is one of distancing, as in Ecuador,17 there is continual instability.  Where do we put 
Colombia?  Colombia’s political agenda is made up of other focal points, because it only 
began to suffer economic problems late, whereas those of security have traditionally been 
enormous.18  But there is an analogous mechanism.  When the security problems are defined 
in terms of wearing down and the military is discredited, the solution is a democratic pact 
(Frente Nacional).  Exasperation with security problems and high military prestige could lead 
to another type of outcome.   
This underscores the fact that neoliberal adjustment, despite its centrality in some countries, 
has not always and everywhere been the main motive for conflict and reaction.  Where the 
historic memory of hyperinflation or of insecurity predominates, the conflicts have been 
articulated differently.  How then shall we lay out the relationship between economics 
(neoliberal reforms) and politics (transition and democratic consolidation) in this context? 
The first thing is to clarify what the specificity of the dual transition consists of in the Andean 
world, if indeed there is one.  With Williamson, ‘structural adjustment’, or alternatively 
neoliberalism, can be defined as:  
opening the economy plus reordering public expenditure priorities, financial 
liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and the provision of an enabling 
environment for the private sector.19   
From this perspective, a good part of the world’s democratic transitions were dual, both of 
political regime and of economic model.  Almost all of them went from a (very) closed 
economy to an open one.  As in the Andean world, many debates concentrated on deciding if 
such a leap should be gradual or radical.20   
The specificity of our transition resides precisely in the fact that the leap was relatively short – 
from one type of market economy to another.  In the ‘real’ socialisms, one of the fundamental 
focal points of the political sphere was the aspiration for ‘economic freedom’ (i.e., property 
rights).  In the Andean countries, politics revolves around other themes, of which the central 
one is development. The magnitude of this crucial difference in the conformation of the 
political sphere can be grasped when the problem of temporal horizons in different contexts is 
                                                 
16 Chávez had the support of well-off sectors of society in his first stages. 
17 Currently.  But it should be noted that when there was a threat, as in the sixties, a rupture occurred. 
18 In Peru in the late eighties, there was a superimposing of motifs: hyperinflation and security. 
19 John Williamson, ‘The Progress of Policy Reform in Latin America’, in John Williamson (ed.), Latin 
American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?, Washington, DC: Institute for International Relations, 1990, 
p.402. 
20 See, for example, Jeffrey Sachs, et al., ‘Economic reforms and constitutional transition’, CID Working Paper 
43, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2000. 
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examined.  The motif of ‘tightening our belt today [the zaciskanie pasa of the Polish] to have 
prosperity tomorrow’ appeared very strongly in the Eastern and Central European transitions.  
But it corresponded to the aspirations of very broad population sectors – perhaps with the 
exception of unskilled workers, who had little political voice in any event – and paid off in the 
present: increase in private owners, foreign investment and links with Western Europe, 
etcetera, were palpable and attainable, even for the losers (many of whom could aspire to be 
winners afterward).  Said in other terms, in the transitions from ‘real’ socialism, protection 
and growth were being sacrificed today to obtain economic freedom now, even though the 
reformers’ argument implied that both liberty and growth would be obtained in the future.  In 
the Andes, in contrast, a new world is not being created, nor is there a panoply of 
opportunities for a very large number of new actors.  Without any extenuating circumstances, 
the adjustment involves a strict interchange between different times.  Sectors of the 
population are asked to make sacrifices today to obtain benefits tomorrow. 
Such a circumstance has a dual effect on the way democracy acts and is conceived.  The first, 
which is not hard to understand, is that it undermines its social base.  Let’s assume for a 
moment a rather Panglossian outlook, and suppose that while the system punishes workers 
more than businesspeople, the adjustment favours all in the long term, because it brings the 
system closer to the frontier of optimality. 21  Even then, if a strict trade-off between today and 
tomorrow is demanded, huge distributional conflicts may arise if the discount rate of 
important sectors of the given society are sufficiently high.  This, it can be argued, is precisely 
what happens in the Andean countries trough the informalisation of labour (closely related, in 
turn, to the neoliberal programme).    
Note that the tension between temporal horizons is typical of all development processes, and 
for that reason they put democratic regimes themselves into tension.  The specificity of the 
adjustment is that the population sectors least able to wait are hit the hardest, unless they are 
highly organised.  The governments thus face the dilemma of having huge masses that are 
highly organised and hostile to the adjustment (Ecuador, Bolivia), or not organised but 
radically worried about the present.  Even with that, workers –  especially informal workers – 
will oppose the adjustment because their discount rate time is typically higher than that of the 
capitalists.  This obviously is not a ‘cultural’ problem:22 the ability to wait of the unemployed 
and underemployed majorities in the Andes is very close to zero, since a cut in their well-
being today endangers their very capacity to subsist and reproduce.23  Ironically, it might be 
that where a very organised workers’ movement exists, supported in a solid formal economy, 
and able to obtain lateral payoffs and compensations, and to structure their distribution among 
their rank and file over time (Poland, New Zealand), adjustment programmes might fare 
better.  Where organisational levels are relatively low and the informal economy widespread, 
such a possibility does not exist.  It is no accident that a good measure of the discourse of the 
Andean economy, returning to its roots, has turned into a ‘theory of moral sentiments’, 
                                                 
21 I think that it is a probabilistic question in reality.  If we assume that some adjustment is necessary but that 
there are two variants (orthodox and non-orthodox), taking the first, as in the Andean area, is like buying a 
lottery ticket.  In some cases, wagering on the orthodox adjustment has functioned, in others it has not.  Given 
that a lot is at stake, only actors very inclined to take risks – such as those who have gone through a 
hyperinflationary crisis and feel they have nothing to lose – will take the bet willingly. 
22 See Moore’s brilliant criticism of naïve culturalist explanations. 
23  Of course, this in only a hypothesis.  If it carries any grain of truth it also offers another interesting irony: the 
greater the informal labour sector becomes, the more resistance based on short time horizons reforms will 
encounter.  By informalising labour, neoliberalism engenders the conditions for the type of resistance that might 
make economic modernisation in its present form unfeasible.  These kind of internal inconsistencies are one of 
the many reasons against the neoliberal theological conviction according to which the model is right, and that all 
the problems stem from the naughty reality (or the wrong culture). 
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dedicated to punishing the ‘culture of disorder’ and the immediatist focus of the majority of 
the population.   
All this generates an abyss between the times of the elector and those of the ruler, altering the 
content of the representation and undermining the key liberal principle according to which a 
citizen is the best judge of her own interests.24  Adjustment is posited in a dual temporal 
reference.  On the one hand, its benefits will only begin to be registered in the future.  Those 
opposed to it have not identified their own interests well – they are sacrificing their future 
prosperity in exchange for little now.  On the other, delays could have irreparable effects and 
precipitate immediate disasters.  It is urgent to proceed immediately, although the returns only 
begin to be seen much later. 
 
The obsolescence of the political institutions  
Although the coexistence of both transitions has deteriorated democracy, undermining its 
social base and its liberal contents, it could strengthen it in many other key aspects.   The 
expectations were precisely that.  The adjustment had its own social justice banner – a fact 
that it is easy to forget – whose nucleus was the clearing away of entrenched privileges and 
opaque rules of the game.25  The dismantling of the patronage system and of the protection of 
inefficient producers are canonical examples of what such a programme could offer.  The 
correlate of putting an end to the privileges was to incorporate broad sectors of the population 
into a political game with accountability and transparency.  In that regard, there would be 
positive feedback between the two transitions.  In turn, as the dual transition was supported by 
the modernisation, urbanisation and strengthening of the middle class that occurred in Period 
1, there would be a new, more adept social base to interact with the democratic institutions.  
Authors such as Diamond constantly express their hope that both processes are taking place;26 
but it is quite apparent that the balance in the Andean area has not lived up to such 
expectations.  What has happened to the institutions?  The general panorama is relatively easy 
to describe: a generalised rebellion against the parties and, save in the Bolivian case until 
recently, against the congresses.  The institutions that make up the nucleus of democracy are 
being dismantled or seriously weakened.  Why?  I will propose some possible interpretations 
below.   
                                                 
24 Adam Przeworski, et al. (eds), Democracy, accountability and representation , Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. 
25  In practice, of course, such housecleaning has been selective: but what is of interest here is to present the 
general principle. 
26  Larry Diamond, et al. (eds), Consolidating the third wave democracies.  Themes and perspectives, Baltimore 
and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1997. In fact, the supposed basis of the orthodox institutional 
engineering is that a confluence exists between liberal modernisation and democratisation on the one side, and 
between democracy and development on the other: “no further ideological debate is required to demonstrate that 
democracy is  a necessary condition for development” (Fernando Carrillo (ed.), Democracia en déficit.  
Gobernabilidad y desarrollo en América Latina y el Caribe, Washington: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo 
(BID), 2001, pp.4-10).  In reality, it is empirically demonstrated that the correlation between democracy and 
development is tenuous if it exists at all (here I am being much more prudent than Przeworski et al. (2000), who 
definitively think it does not exist).  The good news is that there is no inverse relation.  I believe that something 
similar could be said with respect to adjustment and democracy, but this of course would have to be finally 
evaluated based on ‘big numbers’. 
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The dismantling of the congress.   
In Peru, the congress was the institution that fell under Fujimori’s most intense scorn, just as 
happened in Chávez’s Venezuela.  In Ecuador, virtually all Presidents have had violent 
clashes with the parliament.  In Colombia, as was already pointed out, the spectre of a 
revocation of the congress was a constant of the nineties.  These attacks are not the least bit 
mysterious or enigmatic: they correspond to the enormous disparagement of the congresses in 
their respective countries and to the possibility of earning points by attacking them.  The 
constitutional engineers have moved in an analogous direction, not only in Peru and 
Venezuela, where a small and single-chamber congress was installed with the explicit 
objective of making it more docile, but also in Ecuador, where the 1998 Constitution gave 
more attributions to the executive by removing them from the legislative.  The Colombian one 
of 1991 went in the opposite direction, but the demand of the executive, of public opinion and 
of the majority of political actors is to correct that tendency, and they have good chances of 
prevailing. 
How can the weakening of the area’s congresses be understood in the context of the dual 
transition?  Although the issue has many aspects27 – some of which will be touched on below 
– I will concentrate in this section on a central and simple one that can be enunciated very 
plainly: the congress has become a nuisance.  It is an obstacle to urgent decision-making in 
the public interest.  Many of the architects of the institutional changes that have weakened the 
Andean parliaments have formulated it just that explicitly.  As has been said by former 
Ecuadorian President Oswaldo Hurtado, perhaps the main artificer of the 1998 charter:  
No other Constitution has so reduced the influence of the National Congress in 
conducting the Ecuadorian economy free of instability and crisis, and this is the 
first Constitution that has deprived the Congress of the faculty it traditionally had: 
to dismiss, censure or remove ministers of state from office.  The first and 
foremost problems of governance were in these fields….28  
 
Why does the sensation exist that the congresses have become a “parliamentary Leviathan”?29  
Executive- legislative tensions are nothing new in the Andean area, and even in those 
countries with a strong democratic tradition, such as Colombia, the confrontations have been 
periodic and intense.  What is new about the tension can be grasped in two ways.  On the one 
hand, presidentialism plus proportional parliamentary representation generates an institutional 
division of labour in which the presidents embody ‘national interests’ and long-range 
concerns, while the congresses express the immediate concerns and demands of particular 
social groups.  On the other, there is the need to push through urgent laws whose benefits will 
only be seen in the future and whose approval by a present-oriented congress responsive to 
particularistic demands is improbable and/or costly.  The adjustment creates a terrain for 
debate between its advocates and its adversaries centred on the public good and, in the longer 
term, one constructed around categories such as nation and people; while the congresses, with 
their networks of single- issue clientele that can elect with ‘few’ votes, are completely out of 
place in such a discussion.  It is the good of all (the citizenry, the members of an ethnic group 
or the people) against the good of a handful (the politicians and their cliques). 
                                                 
27 Some sub-national collegial bodies have also lost weight, but that issue is beyond the scope of this text. 
28 Cited in Peña (2002), p.45. 
29 Gary Cox & Matthew McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. 
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As there has been a veritable constitutional storm in the Andean area (two new Constitutions 
and various substantial reforms in Ecuador; two in Peru; one in Venezuela; one in Bolivia; 
and the same in Colombia, with several major reforms along the way), the difficulties of the 
congresses could comfortably be posited from that perspective.  In fact, what is happening 
could be understood in very compact form using the powerful conceptualisation of 
constitutional technology constructed by Buchanan and Tullock.30  For them, when political 
agents find themselves in the (initial) constitutional situation, they must make a trade-off 
between two kinds of costs that will be imputed to them henceforward.  The first are those of 
decision-making: how much will it cost in time, effort and money to collectively adopt a 
policy?  The second are those of externalities: what externalities could be heaped on me if a 
given course of action is adopted?  In a veto system – in which consensus is required to be 
able to do anything – the decision costs are enormous, but those of externalities nil (one can 
block anything that has a cost).  In a dictatorship, those of decision are – at least 
hypothetically – near zero, but the externalities could end up infinite, as when the dictator 
takes away your life (see Figure 1).  Insofar as the gamble keeps growing and delays threaten 
to generate a crisis of hyperinflation and insecurity, the emphasis starts falling on the onerous 
decision costs.  In turn, the requirements of modernisation – and of public order in Peru and 
Colombia – also pressure for lowering the decision costs.  Where different social sectors 
speak in the name of great categories and urgent reforms, the emphasis on decision costs 
starts shrinking the congress’s role.  The temptation to castigate minorities with externalities 
that are prohibitively high grows – and when it is articulated with transnational policies, like 
the ‘war on drugs’, it results in huge distributional and attributional conflicts (like in Bolivia 
or, in a much different sense, in Colombia). Note that the consociational pacts are found in the 
‘high decision costs- low externalities costs’ extreme while the semi-democracies come closer 




                                                 
30 James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The calculus of consent: logical foundations of constitutional democracy, 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962. 
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The rebellion against the parties.    
The obsolescence of the parties is hardly less dizzying than that of the congresses.  Although 
we are very far from understanding even the rudiments of the problem,31 some prominent 
aspects can already be put forward.   
First, the patronage system is no longer what it once was.  In fact, the patronage system seems 
to have fallen victim to its own success in more than one sense.  A combination of wide-
reaching social processes and institutional reforms common to the whole area – 
decentralisation, for example – separated the regional patrons from the centre and at times 
even cut them free from the local notables, converting them into a strange actor with respect 
to the national and sub-national elites.  In some countries politics ‘ceased being respectable’, 
and stopped expressing ‘the majesty of the state’.  The most radical process in this sense was 
the Colombian one, in which we moved from having a few political elites who more or less 
adequately expressed the social and regional structure, to other far more decentralised, 
tumultuous elites linked to multiple power centres.32  In Period 1, they were the epitome of 
responsibility and claimed for Colombia the role of ‘moral force’; in Period 2, they have 
become an icon of decomposition. 33  But a similar process could have occurred in Ecuador.  
There the Populist forces, which are among the most patronage-riddled,34 shifted from the 
ecumenical, sublime discourse of José María Velasco Ibarra (from the thirties to the sixties, 
approximately) to the neighbourhood bully language of the Bucarams (end of the seventies to 
date), which Cueva has called “lumpen politics”. 35  This “lumpen politics” also arranges 
things to be able to express the voice of illegality.36  In either case, independent of the 
programme of each force, the political style acquires a dynamic of its own that can produce 
tangible deeds and influence the whole set of political and social forces (a theme that will be 
returned to in the following section).  
In synthesis, three things have happened.  First, aspects of the political agenda have been 
fixed (for better or for worse).37  Second, some agenda issues have become urgent and 
national and/or of class/ethnicity, while the political forces represented in the congress have a 
particularist language and  mobilisation techniques due to the division of labour between the 
legislative and executive branches.  Third, society has become estranged from politics, both 
‘downward’ and ‘upward’.  The resources that could be shared out through the patronage 
networks are increasingly haggled over.  In turn, a very deep rupture has occurred between 
                                                 
31  I would hold that we have not yet even conceptualised well what a political party is and what that denotes in 
the Andean world.  
32 Among them organised crime : see Francisco Gutiérrez, ‘Historias de democratización anómala.  El Partido 
Liberal en el sistema político colombiano desde el Frente Nacional hasto hoy’, in Gutiérrez F. (ed.), 
Degradación o cambio.  Evolución del sistema político colombiano , Bogota: Norma, 2002, pp.25-78. 
33  And the patron-client relationship, in diverse variants, is used in both. 
34 Amparo Menéndez Carrión, La conquista del voto.  De Velasco a Roldós, Quito: Corporación Editora 
Nacional-Flacso, 1986; Jorge León, ‘Clientelismo y política en sectores urbanos’, Ecuador Debate 13 (May 
1987), pp.129-142. 
35 Agustín Cueva, El proceso de dominación política en el Ecuador, Quito: Planeta, 1997. 
36 Simón Pachano, ‘Ecuador: Bucaram, ¡fuera!; Bucaram, ¿fuera?’, Anuario Social y Político de América Latina 
y el Caribe, 1997, pp.42-50. 
37 Although it can be agreed that the spectrum of choices of economic programs has narrowed effectively in the 
new times, Boix has shown that developed countries still have room for choice.  This margin of choice shrinks in 
proportion to the degree of indebtedness and economic weakness (Carles Boix, Partidos políticos, crecimiento e 
igualdad: estrategias económicas conservadoras y socialdemócratas en la economía mundial, Madrid: Alianza 
Universidad, 1996).  Of course, the Andean specificity is not absolute, as will be seen several times in the section 
on the pacts. 
 15
political personnel and socio-economic elites.38  The most dramatic and constant 
manifestation of the phenomenon is surely found in Colombia, precisely where both sides are 
better articulated, but it is general, and in some cases has reached moments of authentic 
exasperation.  At the same time that politics has seen its attributions stripped – to name only 
one case, with the creation of independent central banks in the new constitutions – it is also 
distancing itself from society and becoming irrelevant in mutually reinforcing processes.  
Nonetheless, the reach of this mechanism is limited: as society’s leaders are rotated through 
elections, there is always manoeuvring room to struggle for the adjudication of scarce 
resources. 
If this is the case, it forces upon politicians an ‘economy of signals’, the main aspect of which 
is the need to represent themselves as non political: they have to go to elections, to obtain 
votes in the name of society against politics.  Note first of all that this kind of politics is 
Escherian: it is politicking about, and against, politics.  It is no accident that the political 
reforms in Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela – and the constitutional reforms throughout the 
area – have become a genuine myth that any candidate who truly aspires to win dare not 
ignore.  The new options have been built over the grave of disparaged particularism, 39 and the 
economy of signals in the electoral game thus will depend on the capacity to present oneself 
as somebody new, who does not belong to the old cliques.   
The discussion can be presented under a somewhat different light if the same idea is presented 
in slightly different language.  The preferred space of the electors is built out of a few key 
problems (hyperinflation, security, growth, corruption).  Electors have very imperfect 
information and little time to form their preferences, thus they will fix on prominent 
characteristics and visible cues that indicate whether a given candidate can produce renewal 
or not.  Among such characteristics is that of ‘being different,’ of ‘not being one of them,’ 
precisely because part of the information of electors – both those ‘at the bottom’ and those ‘at 
the top’ – is that the old way of doing things offers shrinking marginal benefits in the best of 
cases.  The parties have historically fulfilled the function of providing summarised 
information through differentiating icons and languages, but now with a tragic circumstance: 
together with that ‘exercise of differentiation,’ they transmit fairly enough the idea that ‘they 
are the same ones,’ a ‘machinery’ based on tradition, since the notion of organisation and of 
tradition are both vital if a party is to subsist.  The parties, then, are poorly mated with 
Escherian politics.  The renewal message, however, goes over very well on television, which 
became the main medium for shaping political preferences in the Andean world in the 
eighties. 
‘Not belonging to the same clique’ and ‘opposing politicians’ has thus become an axis of the 
creation of political space, together with ‘being hard-handed’ when there is a security crisis – 
and honest.  This has produced an impressive boom in symbolic politics: that is, an iconic and 
prosodic public auction for denouncing the traditional way of conducting politics and marking 
one’s difference with it.  In Ecuador, the candidate and then President Abdalá (‘el Loco’) 
Bucaram had a musical group – which went through diverse styles from salsa to rock – and an 
extravagant stage presence.  With minor electoral bases, but in any event with varying degrees 
                                                 
38  In some countries, such as Peru in the sixties, the business class believed that politicians were one of the main 
obstacles to its activities (Carlos Vilas (ed.), La democratización fundamental.  El populismo en América Latina, 
Mexico DF: Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, 1994).  In others, such as Colombia, the situation was 
different.  Now, for a variety of reasons, there is tension and estrangement in all of them, which of course 
coexists with thousands of both affective and strategic links (starting with financing). 
39 It is worth stressing that the objective base of this disparagement is enormous: corruption, anti-technical 
allocation of funds, etc.  
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of relevance, television personalities and MCs such as Freddy Elhers made an important 
career.  In Venezuela, Chávez’s media boutades are well known (but the main one, his coup 
attempt, was what thrust him into the limelight as an individual free of the cliques).  Fujimori, 
as has been extensively shown, was a TV man.  Even in Bolivia and Colombia, with their 
relatively strong party traditions, the symbolic style has become more and more important.  
Bolivia’s CONDEPA (Conciencia de Patria) is a child of television.  The main independent 
Colombian figures disguise themselves as comic strip superheroes and create happenings with 
rats, cats, monkeys and rabbits around issues such as corruption and security.  They measure 
their strength through their connection with the media.  At the same time, the presence of 
dance artists and sports figures in the recent elections has been sizable.  This extravagant style 
that so delights reporters – costumes, happenings that portray adversaries as long-tailed 
monkeys or rats, nudes, musical entertainment, sexual references of all kinds – goes far 
beyond folklore: it is a new economy of signals in the making.  The style is acquiring 
increasing centrality because it is increasingly becoming the programme (i.e., not being one of 
the ‘old ones’), in a turn that McLuhan would have applauded; the form (presenting oneself as 
external to the machinery) is the message.  The learning process proceeds in the obvious 
manner: insofar as symbolic politics produces results, more and more ‘traditional’ politicians 
start using it, with the consequence that insiders are imitating the outsiders, which gradually 
guts the parties. 
Three observations are worth making about this decay of the parties, which goes well beyond 
what is happening in Europe.  First, despite everything, the ‘folklore’ surrounding this 
phenomenon – extraordinarily entertaining, all things aside – results from a rational behaviour 
in the midst of an economy of signals with imperfect information.  There is no central 
architect planning the end of the parties (though of course there are many anti-party 
ideologies), but rather signals, learning experiences and fads.  Many electors form their 
preferences based on new labels, precisely those that the party organisation cannot transmit, 
and the candidates start lining up to launch their personalist adventures with whatever 
technique is in vogue at the moment.  Second, the weakening of the parties and the weight of 
tradition did not happen without skirmishes and readjustments.  There were attempts to use 
the old solutions to deal with the new problems.  At the onset of Period 2, electors were still 
thinking about the past, not the future.  It is no accident that the emblematic figures and actors 
who founded the institutionality of Period 1 were often called upon to found that of Period 2.  
Carlos Andrés Pérez, the social democratic chief of Acción Democrática, the party that built 
modern Venezuela, was responsible for making the radical adjustment, and he failed only – 
and precisely – due to his inability to mobilize his party in that process.  Paz Estenssoro, the 
patriarch of Bolivia’s 1952 revolution, also initiated the neoliberal reforms with his new 
economic policy (NEP) of 1986.40  In Colombia, the Liberal Party – which its most loyal 
electoral base viewed as synonymous with reformism and upward social mobility – initiated 
the adjustment policies in the 1990-1994 period.41  The force of tradition played a self-
destructing role: by heading up spectacular forward changes (i.e. governing in a way that was 
radically different from what could have been expected from the set of signals coming out of 
its history and its icons), the organisations weakened themselves and, in general, made it 
enormously difficult for electors to guide themselves in the electoral arena through party tags.  
This leads to the third observation: for this whole set of reasons, the alternative to a 
                                                 
40  Note how the memory is activated in these critical junctures.  NEP is a direct Leninist reference, very apropos 
for a party that lives off its revolutionary tradition.  Ironically, the NEP involved a successful dismantling of the 
Bolivian workers’ movement. 
41 I do not think it is forcing the argument to recall that the populist Abdalá Bucaram instituted a vigorous 
adjustment. 
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particularism in decline in the Andean area has not been the programmatic parties built 
around social fractures, but rather highly personalised forces.  Even in those cases where the 
former outsiders have burned out with the exercise of government, they have been beaten at 
their own game.  Their opponents are ad hoc forces that depend on media muscle and on the 
economy of signals based not on organisations but on the capacity to present themselves as 
separate from the cliques: Primero Justicia in Venezuela or the Toledo coalition in Peru. 
 
Pacts and selected solutions 42 
The fact that the conditions are new, or that the problems being posed are different, does not 
in itself constitute either a great novelty or a great problem.  The institutional forms can be 
adapted to other contents, strengthening and developing themselves in the process.  
Nonetheless, as seen in the previous section, the specific modality adopted by the tension 
between the two transitions in the Andean area has suddenly undermined the viability of 
central democratic forms for democratic intermediation, such as parties or congresses.  It 
remains to be seen whether this in turn has contributed to the system’s general debility, and 
how. 
The answer is a simple yes, and the explanation is simple as well: the solutions and skills of 
Period 1 do not work in Period 2.  Thus, in the best of cases, there will be a lag between the 
maturation of the problem and the development of solutions.   
In Period 1, two modalities of democratic government appeared.43  First, consociational pacts, 
such as in Colombia and Venezuela.  Second, a post-revolutionary social pact, as in Bolivia 
(see Annex 2, with the respective details).  In Venezuela there was the ‘Punto Fijo’ Pact, 
signed on 31 October 1958 between the military and economic elites and the following 
parties: Democratic Action (AD), Social Christian Party (Copei) and Democratic Republican 
Union (URD).44  The pact established the commitment to civilise party relations and defend 
constitutionality and the right to govern in accord with the electoral result: a national unity 
government (with participation in the Cabinet by the forces party to the pact); no party 
hegemony and the presentation of a minimum common programme.  In Colombia, the 
National Front pact was constructed, signed by the Liberal and Conservative parties and 
approved by society through a referendum.  It sought to solve the serious problem of inter-
party violence that had characterised the previous stage and block the flirtations with 
populism of the military regime of General Rojas Pinilla (1954-1957).  In Bolivia, the 
revolution made way for a corporatist regime in which ‘co-government’ by the unions was 
formalised.  What these three experiences have in common is highlighted by Lijphart, who 
has developed the bulk of the literature on the issue: they offered different ‘mutual veto’ 
modalities, or guarantees of concurrent majorities, that would serve to protect the vital 
interests of the parties and, above all, of the significant minorities within the pact.45  In 
Colombia, such a design implied the requisite of super-majority votes (two-thirds) to approve 
                                                 
42  The expositions in this part were detailed with the concurrence of María Teresa Pinto. 
43 There had also been two ways of governing dictatorially.  Developmentalist regimes, which built the hope of 
making a social base for themselves in the military -peasant alliance, as in Peru and Ecuador, or in repressive 
dictatorships, as in Bolivia.  Some, such as Bolivia’s Bánzer, mixed the characteristics of reformism and 
repression.  See Annex 1, Table B, which compares Periods 1 and 2 from the viewpoint of the regimes. 
44  Signed by Rómulo Betancourt, Raúl Leoni and Gonzalo Barrios, of AD; Jóvito Villalba, Ignacio Luis Arcaya 
and Manuel López Rivas, of URD; and Rafael Caldera, Pedro del Corral and Lorenzo Fernández, for Copei. 
45 See, for example, Arend Lijphart, Democracies: patterns of majoritarian and consensus government in twenty 
one countries, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984. 
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legislation, equitable sharing of posts (including those of popular election) among the 
traditional parties, and a forced successive presidential alternation; and in Bolivia, the 
working class capacity to veto the policies that jeopardised it.46  With all the ways in which 
these political processes and their contexts were distinct, they are similar in the sense that a 
disposition would be blocked if a significant sector with a voice within the pact so desired. 
Such protection of minority interests – or of sectors with some sensation of threat – served 
many objectives, the main one of which, in accord with the basic precepts of the literature on 
transition, was to guarantee that democracy would be “the only game in town,” to use the 
expression popularised by Linz.47  If the probability of reaching intolerably costly 
denouements was minimal, nobody would be tempted to bail out.  Thus the country was 
protected from an involution, and at the same time the conditions were constructed for a more 
stable future.  Although the term did not yet exist, the Andean consociationalists were 
gambling on consolidation.  Like Moliére’s manservant, they spoke prose without knowing it.  
The consolidation did not take place, since the pacts were victims of their own success.  
Insofar as they restricted – albeit concertedly – key aspects of democracy such as alternation, 
routinising and/or ritualising it, the generation formed within the pacts began to rebel aga inst 
them.  What’s more, “strategic depoliticisation” (following Lijphart’s expression), which 
forms part of the pact’s programme and results from divvying up power and the negotiated 
transacting of conflicts, was added to the combination of presidentialism and proportional 
parliamentary election. 48  But that institutional division of labour, depoliticisation and the 
possibility of blackmailing an executive who had to win over very large majorities to push 
legislation through, fed particularism enormously.  The same tools that consolidated 
democratic and political stability offered incentives for exclusion and corruption, not to 
mention immobilisation.     
The pacts were thus corroded by their own dynamic.  Once again, the time factor plays a key 
role: consociationalism is subjected to an intense material fatigue once the memory of the 
threat disappears and the routinising of the political procedures is completed.49  After some 
years, even the pact’s advantages begin to seem relative.  The guarantees to the minorities can 
be interpreted as particularist perks at the cost of the common good, and stability as 
stagnation.   
In synthesis, the kit of democratic government solutions was very well defined in Period 1: 
pacts around large and clientelised parties, structured worker and peasant organisations, and 
highly institutionalised channels for transacting particular interests.  The contrast between the 
constitutional technology of Periods 1 and 2 can also be described very synthetically and 
comfortably in the terms of the previous section: while in Period 1 the preference was to incur 
decision costs, avoiding those of externalities, the inclination in Period 2 was toward 
externalities costs and not those of decision.  The preferred government socio-techniques in 
Period 1 are negotiation, lobbying and compensation, which are increasingly incongruent and 
unacceptable in Period 2. 
                                                 
46  The army had been virtually dismantled and replaced by national guards. 
47 See, for example, Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, ‘Towards Consolidated Democracies’, Journal of Democracy, 
7:2 (1996), pp.14-33. 
48  The latter constitutes another of the key characteristics of consociational regimes, as Lijphart (1984) reminds 
us. 
49  Lijphart already foresaw this, and we have eloquent examples of consociational erosion outside of the Andean 
area. 
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In Period 2, immobilisation has been defeated, but pacts and alliances appear only rarely: no 
one has guarantees against very disagreeable results, not even capitalists, who are 
occasionally severely affected by the adjustment or by some of its specific policies.50  The 
veto and the concurrent majorities disappeared, swept away by the urgency of the reforms, but 
also because the national decision-making framework had deteriorated and because decision 
costs were considered high and those of externalities low.  The desired result – ‘democracy as 
the only game in town’ – is obtained through a set of exogenous restrictions and/or the 
balancing of the domestic actors’ mutual fears, as in Ecuador.  This implies that disastrous 
results for significant sectors come about within democracy.  The effect is cumulative because 
it produces mutual memories and expectations of mistrust.  The new democracy is associated 
with economic openness, but precisely for that reason it is exposed to intolerable – and 
procedurally hardly democratic – outcomes for important sectors.  In Ecuador, for example, 
broad social groups had (and still have) reasons to think that the economic programme is 
completely fixed, insulated from political competition and independent of the political stripe 
of the government in office, and that the programme is imposing prohibitive costs on them.   
The opening, then, has generated levels of uncertainty that significant actors might consider 
intolerable.  One would like to see a mutual reinforcement between democratisation and 
stability, but the opposite has happened in the Andean area.  Opening (both political and 
economic) and instability not only coexist, but reinforce each other. 
Two questions remain to be answered.  First, why has Bolivia been able – after a long 
dictatorial interregnum – to construct a democracy in Period 2 that has remained in good 
shape, albeit with growing signs of erosion?  Because the attempt to reproduce the techniques 
of Period 1,51 during the government of Siles Suazo (1982-1985), failed miserably and 
triggered hyperinflation.  That generated broad consensus around an economic stabilisation 
and structural adjustment programme.  As was pointed out in previous sections, such 
consensus, combined with the discrediting of the preceding military regime, made way for a 
broad democratic agreement.  Its formal nucleus was the constitutional disposition that if no 
presidential candidate gets an absolute majority of the votes, the Congress of the Republic 
must determine the winner among the three candidates that received the most votes (until the 
1994 constitutional reform, after which it was between the two that received the most).  The 
installation of a parliamentary pact (called ‘Pact for democracy’) between Víctor Paz 
Estensoro (1985-89), Hugo Banzer’s Nationalist Democratic Action Party (ADN) and the 
Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) took place in this context.  This same pact led to the 
election of Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-93), although the agreement now took the name 
‘Patriotic Accord.’  In 1997, the ADN, in alliance with the MIR, Condepa, the New 
Republican Force, the Christian Democratic Party and the Solidarity Civic Union got the 
presidency through a pact called ‘Commitment for Bolivia’.  In all cases, there have been 
formal and informal guarantees that no prohibitive externalities would devolve upon the 
minority partners.  With the spectacularly successful incorporation of the coca growers into 
active politics in 2002, the Bolivian pact will have to be retooled to offer guarantees to all and 
at the same time maintain the anti-drug policy set by international actors, which seems very 
much like squaring the circle.52   
                                                 
50  The conception of the adjustment implies favouring some ‘creative destruction’ of inefficient businesses. 
51  Ceding administration of the state mines to the unions, announcing that the foreign debt will not be paid, 
increasing export duties; this generated immediate conflicts with the IMF and the World Bank. 
52  But in politics it is possible to square the circle (albeit only with great difficulty). 
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Second and last: by forcing the political opening and raising the costs of moving away from 
democracy, the passage from Period 1 to Period 2 also ultimately renders the government 
methods that constituted Period 1’s characteristic repertoire obsolete.  How is this reflected in 
the level of political intermediation?  In various characteristic ways.  As was pointed out, by 
converting the congress into the epicentre of particularism, it gave the new entrants motive to 
attack the pacts or the established politics (here we are not looking at ‘inventions’ or a ‘social 
construction of the corruption’, but at the results of political dynamics that open windows of 
opportunity to new actors).   Furthermore, the pact’s material fatigue generates a prisoner’s 
dilemma among its members: the best situation for each politician is to take the pact’s 
benefits and denounce it at the same time.  That way they can conserve their social bases and 
aspire to other new ones.  Given that, the old politics’ lack of loyal friends and the hari-kiri of 
the established forces is not so surprising.  By making pacts difficult, the conditions of Period 
2 produce electoral fragmentation – an endemic phenomenon in the whole Andean area – and 
the search for personalist solutions.  As it is very costly to escape fully from democracy, this 
produces a strong presidentialism, which in turn intensifies all the conditions that generate 
fragmentation, leading to desperate new searches for the magic formula of the common good, 
through plebiscitarian practices and institutional engineering.  But the institutional instability 
weakens the parties and the congress, slimming down the institutionality, sparking a new 
round of the cycle.  The serpent has bitten its own tail. 
 
Conclusions  
In this text I have developed a simple and in reality quite conventional argument.  I suggested 
that the Andean area had gone through two transitions – one political and the other of its 
development model – and that they have not been very comfortable bedfellows.  This lack of 
synergy between the two transitions is an empirical fact, not something given by the nature of 
the respective phenomena – neither pre-established harmony nor predetermined catastrophe.  
If democracy and adjustment can relate to each other in many ways (well, average or poorly)– 
then analysts are obliged to establish how and to exhibit the specific mechanisms behind 
differential outcomes.  The challenge is difficult in the Andean area because two things must 
be explained simultaneously: a) the differential outcomes regarding democracies; and b) the 
weakness, but permanence and recurrence, of the democratic structures and practices in the 
area.   
To deal with the problem, I essentially used the time factor, assuming that the times of the 
involution would reveal a significant part of the structure of incentives, learning curves, 
traditions and conflicts behind each result that are common to all countries, although in 
different combinations and articulations in each particular case.  The assumption is that 
behind the superimposition of the two transitions there must be mechanisms of identifiable 
answers, but that at the same time the aggregation of the intentional action would generate its 
own dynamic, as authors such as Merton, Elster and Simon have shown so well.  And, in 
effect, both specific mechanisms (see Annex 1, Tables A and B) and a series of processes that 
weaken but maintain democracy (see Annex 1, Table D) have come to light.  Democratic 
improvements can have undesirable side effects, as when the effort to generate the rule of law 
illegalises broad sectors of the population.  At times we come across haemostats, as in the 
Ecuadorian case, in which the army’s role as arbiter paradoxically helps maintain the 
democratic structures, since it does not offer anyone enough probability of successfully 
getting out of the regime.  On other occasions, we find processes with positive feedback, as in 
the destruction of the party functions, when one of the focal points of the political arena turns 
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into something new that does not belong to the old machinery, or when the adjustment 
increases the informal labour sector, generating high discount rates and thus making it 
difficult to promote the adjustment in democratic terrain.   
Is all this idiosyncratic to the Andes?  It could be argued that analogous phenomena to what 
has been analysed here have taken place in all countries in the world, that voluntary 
organisation and labour have been ceding some ground to the media/capital combination 
everywhere, and that political parties are thus decaying in general, not only in the Andean 
world.  There are two responses to this observation.  First of all, it is empirically debatable 
both that the decay is appearing everywhere,53 and that its intensity is always the same.  It is 
also possible that the contents that characterised party activity for years are no longer viable, 
but this does not mean that the form is necessarily collapsing.  As Stein Rokkan has 
demonstrated, the European parties survived the social fractures on which they had been 
constructed.54  It is perfectly possible that the narrow manoeuvring room in some terrains is 
coexisting with its expansion in others, which permits the forms to renew themselves and 
begin adapting – with changes, of course – to the new contents.  What is notable in the 
Andean world is precisely the blockade of such saving mechanisms because – in both its 
negative and positive aspects – the possibility of political activity that proposes something 
different has been reduced to its minimum expression.  The slightly melancholy nature of 
Toledo’s transition in Peru is precisely due to this circumstance: he promised he would do 
things just like Fujimori, only better. 
It is important to note that the explanation for the obsolescence of the classic institutions of 
democratic intermediation and deliberation requires all the factors discussed here.  If the 
countries were not medium-sized, subordinated and with medium to low development, they 
would have more room for manoeuvre to set policies, and the opening would not have created 
so many reserved domains.  If the move to Period 2 had only been a great social 
misadventure, without any element of genuine modernisation, it would already have been 
wiped from the map by a huge social upheaval.   If it were possible to escape from 
democracy, the politicians’ audiences would not necessarily be electoral ones and the 
emphasis on symbolic politics would be less pronounced.  If the implementation of the 
changes were not so urgent, the deliberative arenas would not suffer such sharp deterioration, 
even if the returns from those changes were only seen in the long term.  If the politics and the 
economics of Period 1 had not been so closed, such symbolism would have been unable to 
survive as a modernising aperture.  If the military regimes had not occasionally shown a 
reformist variant, the move from Period 1 to Period 2 would have been different, and some 
electors would have few reasons to consider the pre-democratic regimes with a certain amount 
of benevolence.  And so forth. 
At times a set of variables generates a phenomenon, but limits its scope.  It is like an 
imperfect haemostat, because it produces not stability but relatively wide fluctuations around 
a point.  I have tried to show here that this could have happened in the relations between 
liberal globalisation-modernisation on one side and democracy on the other.  
                                                 
53 Howard Reiter, ‘Party decline in the West: a skeptic’s view’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1:3 (1989), 
pp.325-348. 
54 See, for example, Stein Rokkan, et al., State formation, nation building and mass politics, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999. 
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Annex 1 





and weaken democracy 
More  Less 
Limitations to sovereignty 
Additional controls on the 
rulers; high costs of escaping 
from democracy 
The conflicts are generated in a 
global framework and debated in 
a national one 
Independent central bank More mutual controls 
Sets economic programme; key 
public policies remain in hands of 
unelected authorities 
Transparency Accountability 
Deterioration of the more 
vulnerable bodies that are easiest 
to attack (like congress) 
Identity-based politics  
Incorporation of new social 
sectors Weakening of the parties 
Media activism  
More accountability and public 
opinion oversight  
Concentration of power; 





 Period 1 Period 2 
Flee from democracy 
Possible, on condition of not 
allying with the communists Very costly 
Relation with the regions  




Elections  Few, periodical Many, with many exceptional 
convocations 
Economy Closed Open 
Central bank Dependent on the government Independent 
Economic policy 
Changing (at times through 
violent jolts) 
Fixed (the rhythms change, at 
times through violent jolts) 
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Table C 
Regime/Period Period 1 Period 2 
Democracy  Consociational pacts- Bolivian social pact 
Competitive regimes- 
Bolivian pact 
Exit from democracy Developmentalist military-Disciplinary military Strong presidentialism 
 
Table D 
Mechanism Cases Example  
Undesired side effects of 
improvement Colombia, Bolivia  
The establishment of law and 
order makes broad social sectors 
illegal 
Unexpected side effects of 
worsening Ecuador 
Weakening of the parties makes 
the conflicts more manageable  
Haemostats Arbiter role of the Ecuadorian army 
A mechanism generates a 
process that is limited to itself 
Positive feedback All countries except Bolivia  Fragmentation 
Trade-off 
Fujimori’s Peru, anti-politics in 
the area 
Political populism to be able to 
obviate the economic  
Confluence of adversaries Modernizing adjustment and ethnic movements Weakening of the national state 
Tragedy of the triumph Colombia 
Clientelism was more 
democratising than expected, 




Comparison of the pacts in Venezuela Fixed Point Pact), Colombia (National Front) and Bolivia (Pact for Democracy, Patriotic Accord 
and Compromise for Bolivia ) 
Prepared by María Teresa Pinto 
 
Characteristic Venezuela Colombia Bolivia 
Pact and years 
of duration 
Fixed Point Pact (31 October 
1958-1964) 
National Front (1958-86) Pact for Democracy 
(1985-89)  




For Democratic Republican 
Union: Jóvito Villalba, Ignacio 
Luis Arcaya, 
Manuel López Rivas. 
For the Social Christian Party 
Copei: Rafael Caldera, Pedro del 
Corral and Lorenzo Fernández. 
For Democratic Action: Rómulo 
Betancourt and Raúl Leoni. 






Coalilition led by Banzer’s 
party, Nationalist Democratic 
Action (ADN), the 
Revolutionary Left Movement 
(MIR) led by former President 
Jaime Paz Zamora, (who was 
now co-allied with ADN 
between 1989 and 1993), and 
the populist parties Concience 
of Homelad (Condepa) and by 
Solidarity Civic Unity 
From its birth until August 
1998, made up of the 
greatest number of 
partners possible (four 
parties: ADN, UCS, MIR 
and CONDEPA), or eight 
parties if we consider that 
ADN and MIR established 
alliances with small parties 
such as the PDC, NFR, 




Military officers, business people 
and the grassroots sectors 
The military and the industrial, 
commercial and financial elites.  
The grassroots sectors participated 
through a plebiscite in which they 
wee asked for approval of the 
National Front.  The pact was 
approved by a majority (4,169,294 
votes in favor, 206,864 votes 
against and 20,738 ballots left 




financial elites who 
benefited from the 
economic stability 







the pact lasted 
The governments of Rómulo 
Betancourt ( 1958-63) and of Raúl 
Leoni (1963-69) 
1958-62: Alberto Lleras 
Camargo. (Liberal). 1962-66: 
Guillermo León Valencia 
(Conservative). 1966-70: Carlos 
Lleras Restrepo (Liberal). 1970-
74: Misael Pastrana Borrero 
(Conservative). 
Víctor Paz Estensoro 
(1985-89) 
Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-93) Hugo Banzer (1997-2000) 
Presence of 
instability 
during the pact 
In the government of Rómulo 
Betancourt (first government of the 
pact) there were various military 
uprisings and even an attempt on 
the life of the President.  In 1962 
there were various minilitary 
uprisings that received the names 
"Carupanazo" and “Porteñazo", for 
having been developed in the cities 
of Carúpano and Puerto Cabello, 
respectively.  The attempt to which 
we refer occurred on the 
commemoration of the Day of the 
Army, 24 June 1960, when the 
President was on his way to preside 
over the military parade  "The 
Heroes of Caracas” 
A military coup attempt two days 
before the presidential elections 
(2 May 1958) promoted by 
discontented sectors of the 
military and Conservatives (one 
of the factors of instability was 
the lack of an internal accord 
within the Conservative Party). 
Electoral Fraud of General Rojas 
Pinilla (1970).  
 
Mobilisations of the 
grassroots sectors against 
the President’s New 
Economic Plan. 
 Conflicts among the 
participating parties due to 
the intentions of President 






On 9 May 1962 the Communist 
Party of Venezuela (PCV) and the 
Revolutionary Left Movement 
(MIR) are barred and the 
newspaper Tribuna Popular is 
again closed.  
Communist Party and the peasant 
sectors whose demands for land 
radicalised. 
The programmatic accord 
excluded the grassroots 
sectors that worked in the 
minds and other sectors to 
be nationalised (the 
measure was rejected, 
especially by the COB, 
which went on strike.  The 
government responded 
with a state of siege and 





Reformist efforts of the governing 
party (AD) and fears of the other 
parties of never being able to defeat 
AD. 
“Response of the elite to the 
perception of a crisis triggered by 
the fear of being excluded from 
power by the military 
government, the potentially 
revolutionary violence in the 
countryside and the economic 
stagnation” (Hartlyn, 1993, p.21). 
Institutional instability and 
the nationalist tints of the 
previous regime (tThis 
situation motivated 
President Hernán Siles of 
the UDP to resign in mid-
1984, one year before his 
term was over). 
Inability of any presidential 
candidate to reach the 
absolute majority of votes. 
Inability of any presidential 
candidate to reach the 
absolute majority of votes. 
Outgoing 
regime 
Brutal and repressive military 
regime of Pérez Jiménez (1952-58) 
who lead a coup against Rómulo 
for “having been incapable of 
resolving the crisis and against 
Democratic Action for being a 
sectarian party.”  Among the 
policies of the new regime, it 
expelled Rómulo Gallegos from the 
country and dissolved both the 
Democratic Action party and the 
Workers’ Confereration of 
Venezuela (CTV).  This 
government was defeated due to the 
active participation of the masses. 
The military government of 
Rojas Pinilla which initially was 
supported by certain sectors of 
the traditional parties as a 
mechanism for resolving the 
disputes they were facing and 
that had led to the historical 
period of ‘La Violencia.’  The 
government which had populist 
tints, prohibited the Communist 
Party and censored the press. 
Military governments and 
a quite populist and 
nationalist democratic 
regime (Hernán Siles 
Zuazo 1982-85) that ceded 
the administration of the 
state mines to the unions 
and also announced that he 
would not pay the foreign 
debt (Under strong 
pressure from all the social 
sectors, the government 
cut short its own mandate) 
Pactist government of Víctor 
Paz Estensoro (1985-89) 
Government of Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada which 
could well be called a 
concilation government due 
to the presence of an 
indigenous leader in the vice 
presidency (Victo Hugo 





Accords  Defence of constitutionality and of 
the right to govern in conformity 
with the electoral result. 
Government of National Unity (it 
leaves it clear that none of the 
signatory organisations either 
aspires to or accepts hegemony in 
the Exeuctive Cabinet, in which the 
national political currents and the 
country’s independent sectors must 
be represented through a fair 
selection of capacities.  Selection of 
a singly democratic presidential 
candidate, the formation of single 
slates for the collegial bodies) 
A minimum common program 
(formation of a single front based 
on one integral Government 
program) 
Creation of an Inter-party 
Commission of Unity in charge of 
overseeing the compliance with this 
agreement. 
Alternation of the Liberal and 
Conservative parties in the 
presidency (in other words, that 
no other party could stand as an 
independent candidate) and 
splitting up of all the bureaucratic 
and political posts of power. 
This bureaucratic divvying up of 
power also included that of the 
ministries, which required a tacit 
accord among the parties to 
maintain a pact regarding some 
macroeconomic policies. 
Political accord that 
permitted the election of 
Victor Paz Estensoro to 
the presidency (1985-89). 
Programmatic accord that 
permitted the neoliberal 
agenda to be introduced 
into the country.  
Political accord that 
permitted the election of 
Jaime Paz Zamora to the 
presidency (1989-93) and 
gave him political support in 
the Congress for his policies. 
Political accord that 
permitted the election of 





date foreseen in 
the initial 
accord 
“for as long as the factors that 
threaten the republican attempt 
initiated on 23 January lasts” 
The pact was to last 12 years. 
The administration of Carlos 
Lleras Restrepo sought to put an 
end to the Nationalist Front pact 
through a constitutional reform in 
1968 that sought to reduce the 
political parity by allowing 
parties other than the Liberals 
and Conservatives to stand in the 
elections for departmental 
assemblies and municipal 
councils starting in 1970 and for 
the parliamentary elections. 
Presidential alternation ended in 
1974. 
The “Pact for democracy” 
was scrupulously 
respected until February 
1989.  The MNR 
unilaterally broke the 
accord to make viable the 
presidential candidacy of 
Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Lozada, who said “my 





Yes.  The parties maintained strong 
links to mass organisations such as 
the unions and the peasant 
associations.  
No. No, the government 
ignored the grassroots 
sectors (particularly the 
unions) 
No, although a major 





pact to be 
maintained 
Party stability. Constitutional character of the 
pact (on 1 December 1957 the 
plebiscite was called in which the 
population was asked whether it 
accepted an accord between the 
two traditional parties), party 
stability, civic participation. 
Party fragmentation that 
prevented the election of 
the President in the first 
round and the presence of 
article 90 of the 
Constitution, according to 
which if no candidate 
obtained the absolute 
majority of votes the 
Congress would elect the 
President. 
Article 90 of the 
Constitution. 




the fall of the pact 
Opening to the Left Closed regime (fraud by Rojas 
Pinilla) 
Intolerance and resistance to 
the incorporation of the armed 
Left into legal political life. 
Democracy Democracy Democracy 
Transformation of 
the regime for 
2002 
Closed political regime Open political regime 
(Constitution of 1991) with 
war. 
It is not yet clear It is not yet clear It is not yet clear 
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